We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player can strategically choose the bargaining partners among the neighbors and buy their communication links with upfront transfers. We characterize a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria: An efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all discount factors if and only if the underlying network is either complete or circular. We also provide an example of a Braess-like paradox, in which the more links are available, the less links are actually used. Thus, network improvements may decrease social welfare.
Introduction
Bargaining sometimes involves an agreement among three or more players. Examples are abundant; in order to construct a railroad, a number of landowners must agree on it; to undertake a profitable project, an unanimous agreement should be reached among several individuals who have different but indispensable skills or resources. Sometimes each player can cooperate with all the other players so that the unanimous agreement is immediately reached; while other times, some players can cooperate only with a part of other players for informational or physical reasons, and hence an gradual agreement is To analyze multilateral bargaining under cooperation restrictions, we introduce a noncooperative bargaining model in which each player can communicate only with the directly connected players in a given network. In each period, a proposer is randomly selected and the proposer makes an offer specifying a coalition among the neighbors and monetary transfers to each member in the proposed coalition. If all the members in the coalition accept the offer, then the coalition forms and the proposer controls the coalition thereafter, inheriting other members' network connections (See Figure 1) . Otherwise, the offer dissolves. The game repeats until the grand-coalition forms, after which the player who controls the grand-coalition obtains the unit surplus. All the players have a common discount factor. 2 The model has two important features which distinguish it from the existing noncooperative bargaining models in networks. First, we allow strategic coalition formation so that each player can choose the partners to bargain with. In the literature, however, players' strategic interaction is limited in a randomly selected meeting. A bilateral meeting (Manea, 2011a,b; Abreu and Manea, 2012a,b) or a multilateral meeting (Nguyen, 2012) randomly occurs, then the players in the random meeting bargain over their joint surplus. 3 As Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) pointed out, however, a random-meeting-model does not entirely capture players' strategic behaviors, and hence strategic decision on coalition formation should be considered.
Next, we allow players to buy out other players and it enables them to gradually form a coalition. 4 In the Manea/Abreu-Manea/Nguyen model, given a coalition, players' strategic decision is limited on how to split the coalitional surplus: All the players in the coalition, once they reach an agreement, must exit the game and they are excluded in further bargaining. Therefore, those models are not applicable to an environment in which gradual coalition formation is inevitable to generate a surplus. 5 On the other hand, when players can buy out other players as an intermediate step, they not only consider the surplus of the current coalition itself, but also take into account the subsequent bargaining game. Thus players may even form a zero-surplus coalition strategically.
The main result characterizes a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria.
If the underlying network is either complete or circular, then for any discount factor there exists an efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. In such an efficient equilibrium, each player buys out all the neighbors whenever she is selected as a proposer.
However, if the underlying network is neither complete nor circular, then some of the players strategically delay a unanimous agreement when they are sufficiently patient.
Thus, an efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is impossible for a sufficiently high discount factor.
We also provide an interesting example in which adding a new communication link decreases social welfare. This observation is reminiscent of the Braess's paradox which first appeared in Braess (1968) . 6 In the original context, the Braess's paradox refers a situation that constructing a new route reduces overall performance when players choose their route selfishly. Analogously in our model, each player strategically chooses communication links to use for bargaining. Similarly, the more links are available, the less links are actually used. As the result, network improvements decrease social welfare. 7 To our best knowledge, this is the first observation of an analog of the Braess's paradox in the bargaining literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment. Section 3 provides the main characterization result with leading examples. Section 4 considers an alternative model in which players cannot trade their chances of being a proposer. Missing proofs are presented in Appendix.
5 For instance, in a four-player circle, since no one can immediately form the grand-coalition, the surplus cannot be realized in their models.
6 See Braess et al. (2005) for translation from the original German. In recent years, numerous studies on Braess's paradox have been made particularly in computer science and related disciplines. See Roughgarden (2005) for more details.
7 In the Braess's paradox with the traffic network context, all the players are worse off; while in this bargaining in communication networks, some players may be better off even though overall performance deteriorates.
A Model

Networks
A network (or a graph) g = (N, E) consists of a finite set N = {1, 2, · · · , n} of player s (or nodes) and a set E of link s (or edges) of N . When g = (N, E) is not the only network under consideration, the notations N (g) and E(g) are occasionally used for the player set and the link set rather than N and E to emphasize the underlying network g. Through this paper, we assume that g is simple 8 and connected. Given g = (N, E) and S ⊆ N , a
be a set of dominating players in g. A dominating set S is minimal if no proper subset is a dominating set. A network is trivial if |N (g)| = 1. For any integer k = 2, · · · , n − 1,
A complete cover of g is a collection M of subsets of N (g), such that, ∪M = N (g) and g |M is a complete network for all M ∈ M. A complete covering number of g is the minimum cardinality of a complete cover of g. A minimal complete cover is a complete cover of which cardinality is minimum.
A Noncooperative Bargaining Game
A noncooperative bargaining game, or shortly a game, is a triple Γ = (g, p, δ), where g is a underlying network, p ∈ R |N | ++ is an initial recognition probability with i∈N p i = 1, and 0 < δ < 1 is a common discount factor.
A game Γ = (g, p, δ) proceeds as follows. In each period, Nature selects a player i ∈ N as a proposer with probability p i . Then, the proposer i makes an offer, that is, i strategically chooses a pair (S, y) of a coalition S ⊆ N i (g) and monetary transfers y ∈ R |N | + with j∈N y j = 0. Each respondent j ∈ S \ {i} sequentially either accepts the offer or rejects it. 10 If any j ∈ S \ {i} rejects the offer, then the offer dissolves and all the players repeat the same game in the next period. If each j ∈ S \ {i} accepts the offer, then i buys 8 A simple network is an unweighted and undirected network without loops or multiple edges. 9 A circular network (or a circle) should not be confused with a cycle in a network. A circular network is a network that consists of a single cycle.
10 The result does not depend on the order of responses.
out S \ {i}, that is, each respondent j ∈ S \ {i} leaves the game with receiving y j from the proposer i and the remaining players (N \ S) ∪ {i} play the subsequent game Γ (i,S) in the next period. All the players have a common discount factor δ.
After i buys out S \ {i}, or i forms S, the subsequent game Γ (i,S) = g (i,S) , p (i,S) , δ is defined in the following way:
i) The induced network g (i,S) = N (i,S) , E (i,S) , where N (i,S) = (N \ S) ∪ {i} and
That is, after i's S-formation, S \ {i} leaves the network, but i inherits all the network connections from S.
ii) The induced recognition probability p (i,S) :
That is, the proposer i takes the respondents' chances of being a proposer as well.
The game continues until only one player remains, after which the last player acquires one unit of surplus. When the game ends in finite period T , the history h specifies a finite sequenceỹ(h) = {y t (h)} T t=0 of monetary transfers and the last player i * (h) ∈ N . Given Γ = (g, p, δ) and a history h, player i's discounted sum of expected payoffs is
If the game does not end within finite periods, then the history h induces a sequenceỹ(h) of monetary transfers without determining the last player, and hence player i's discounted sum of expected payoffs is
Coalitional States
A (coalitional) state π is a partition of N , specifying a set of active player s N π ⊆ N .
For each active player i ∈ N π , i's partition block [i] π represents the players i together with players whom he has previously bought out. Denote π • by the initial state, that is,
A state π is feasible in g, if there exists a sequence of coalition formations
. Let Π(g) be a set of all feasible states in g. For each π ∈ Π(g), the induced network g π = (N π , E π ) is uniquely determined by
and the induced recognition probability p π is determined by
When there is no danger of confusion, we omit π • in notations, for instance,
, and so on. The description of the underlying network g may also be omitted, when it is clear. For notational simplicity, for any v ∈ R |N | and any S ⊆ N , we
Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We focus on stationary subgame perfect equilibria. A stationary strategy depends only on the current coalitional state and within-period histories, but not the histories of past periods. The existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is known in the literature including Eraslan (2002) and Eraslan and McLennan (2013) . See Lee (2014) for the formal description of stationary strategies. In the literature, instead of considering all the possible stationary strategies, a simple stationary strategy, namely a cutoff strategy, is usually accepted.
A cutoff strategy profile (x, q) consists of a value profile x = {{x π i } i∈N π } π∈Π and a coalition formation strategy profile q = {{q π i } i∈N π } π∈Π , where x π i ∈ R and q π i ∈ ∆(2 N π i )
for each π ∈ Π(g). 11 A cutoff strategy profile (x, q) specifies the behaviors of an active player i ∈ N π : in the following way:
• player i proposes (S, y) with probability q π i (S) such that
• player i accepts any offer (S, y) with i ∈ S if and only if y i ≥ δx π i .
Note that player i can decline to make an offer by choosing S = {i}. A cutoff strategy profile (x, q) induces a probability measure µ x,q on the set of all possible histories. Given 11 Through this paper, for a finite set X, ∆(X) is the set of all possible probability measures in X.
history h, letπ(h) = {π t (h)} T t=0 be a sequence of states which is determined by h. Given (x, q), define the set of inducible states:
Given x, for each π ∈ Π(g), i ∈ N π , and S ⊆ N π i , define a player i's excess surplus of S-formation:
Given a cutoff strategy profile (x, q), define an active player i's continuation payoff in π:
We close this section with two important lemmas which provide fundamental tools for our analysis. Lemma 1 shows that any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium can be uniquely represented by a cutoff strategy equilibrium in terms of a equilibrium payoff vector. Thus, when we are interested in players' equilibrium payoffs or efficiency, without loss of generality, we may consider only cutoff strategy equilibria. Through this paper, an equilibrium refers a cutoff strategy equilibrium. Lemma 2 characterizes a cutoff strategy equilibrium with two tractable conditions, optimality and consistency. More general versions of the proofs can be found in Lee (2014) .
Lemma 1. For any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, there exists a cutoff strategy equilibrium which yields the same equilibrium payoff vector.
Lemma 2. A cutoff strategy profile (x, q) is an stationary subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if, for all π ∈ Π and i ∈ N π , the following two conditions hold,
Efficient Equilibria
In this section, we characterize a necessary and sufficient condition on network structures for efficient equilibria. Given g, define a maximum coalition formation strategy profile
that is, for each state π ∈ Π(g), each proposer i ∈ N π chooses a maximum coalition N π i to bargain with. Given Γ = (g, p, δ), letū(Γ) be a maximum welfare. Note thatū (Γ) is obtained by any cutoff strategy profile involves with a maximum coalition formation
Example 1 
An efficient strategy profile does not necessarily consist of maximum coalition formation strategies. For each π ∈ Π(g), define a set of i's coalitions which maximizes the sum of players' expected payoffs in the subsequent state:
Lemma 3. Given Γ = (g, p, δ), an equilibrium (x, q) is efficient if and only if,
Proof. If |N (g)| = 2, then the statement is obviously true. As an induction hypothesis, suppose the statement is true for any less-than-n-player game. Consider g with |N (g)| =
n. For any π ∈ Π(g), observe that summing (2) over N π yields
where
Sufficiency: Let (x, q) is an efficient equilibrium. By the consistency condition, for all
Since (x, q) is efficient, the induction hypothesis and the definition of efficiency yield
). Then i can strictly improve the sum of the players' payoff by putting more weight on S in his coalition formation strategy and hence q π i cannot be a part of an efficient equilibrium. Necessity: Given g, π ∈ Π(g), and (x, q), define a partial strategy profile (x |π , q |π ) = {(x π , q π )} π ∈Π(g π ) . By induction hypothesis, for all π ∈ Π x,q (g) \ {π • }, (x |π , q |π ) is an efficient equilibrium for a game with g π . Consider the initial state. By (4), in order to maximize i∈N u i (x, q), each player i must maximize S⊆N q i (S)X (i,S) . Since, for all i ∈ N and all S ∈ E i , (x |(i,S) , q |(i,S) ) is an efficient equilibrium for a game with g (i,S) , the condition q i ∈ ∆(E i ) maximizes i∈N u i (x, q) and hence (x, q) is efficient.
We are ready to state our main theorem, which characterizes a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria.
Theorem 1. An efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all discount factors if and only if the underlying network is either complete or circular.
We prove the theorem through four propositions. For the sufficient condition, in subsection 3.1, we construct an efficient equilibrium in a complete network (Proposition 1) and in a circular network (Proposition 2). Moreover, in a complete network, the equilibrium payoff vector is unique and hence any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is efficient. For the necessary condition, Proposition 3 proves the inefficiency result for a specific class of networks, namely pre-complete network s, in subsection 3.2. That is, if the underlying network is pre-complete and non-circular, then any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is inefficient for a sufficiently high discount factor. In subsection 3.3, Proposition 4 completes the necessary condition by showing that, for any game with an incomplete non-circular network, any efficient strategy induces a pre-complete noncircular network with positive probability.
The Sufficient Condition
First, we consider a complete network. Proposition 1 shows that a unanimous agreement is always immediately reached for any p and δ. Furthermore, any equilibrium is efficient and its payoff vector equals to p. Let p = {{p π i } i∈N π } π∈Π .
Proposition 1. Let g be a complete network. For any Γ = (g, p, δ), i) there exists a cutoff strategy equilibrium (p,q);
ii) for any equilibrium, the equilibrium payoff vector equals to p.
Example 2 (A Three-Player Complete Network). Let g be a complete network with N (g) = {i, j, k} and p be an initial recognition probability. In the first period, a proposer i forms a grand-coalition by buying out other two players at the prices of δp j and δp k . Thus the unit surplus belongs to i and his payoff is 1
Next, in a circular network, we construct an efficient equilibrium in which each player always forms a maximum coalition and the equilibrium payoff vector is proportional to the initial recognition probability. Recall that x is the largest integer not greater than
Proposition 2. Let g be a circular network. For any Γ = (g, p, δ), there exists a cutoff strategy equilibrium (x,q), where for all π ∈ Π(g) and all i ∈ N π ,
Example 3 (A Four-Player Circular Network). Let g be a circular network with |N (g)| =
4. For all π with 2 ≤ |N π | ≤ 3, since g π is complete, the equilibrium strategies in a noninitial state π are x π = p π and q π =q π , which are consistent with (5). For the initial state, take any i ∈ N and let N i = {i, j, k}. For any {i} S ⊆ N i , since S-formation induces a complete network, the excess surplus from S-formation is e i (S,
which satisfies consistency condition.
The Necessary Condition : Pre-complete Networks
To prove the necessary condition, we will show that any efficient strategy profile cannot be an equilibrium in any incomplete non-circular network if the discount factor is sufficiently high. First, we need to define a special class of networks, namely pre-complete networks, in which all the players can induce a complete network. Given g, denote a set of i's feasible coalitions which yield a complete network by See Figure 2 for examples of pre-complete networks.
Proposition 3. Let g be a pre-complete non-circular network. For any p, there exists δ < 1 such that for all δ >δ, any efficient strategy profile (x, q) cannot be an equilibrium in Γ = (g, p, δ).
In a pre-complete network, there may or may not be exist a dominating player. We divide the proof into two disjoint cases, D(g) = ∅ and D(g) = ∅.
Case 1: Dominating Players
We provide two leading examples to illustrate an occurrence of a strategic delay. Based on the examples, we discuss a Braess-Like paradox. Then, we prove Proposition 3 in a
The first example is of a three-player chain, in which there is only one dominating
player. In such a chain, the unique dominating player has a stronger bargaining power than the other players so that her value is too high for the other players to buy her out.
Thus, when non-dominating players are recognized as a proposer, they decline to make an offer and a delay occurs.
Example 4 (A Chain). Let g = ({1, 2, 3}, {12, 13}). First, we show an impossibility of an efficient equilibrium. Suppose there exists an efficient equilibrium (x, q). Then player 1 is always included in a proposed coalition, that is, q 1 (N ) = q 2 ({1, 2}) = q 3 ({1, 3}) = 1.
Thus player 1's expected payoff is u 1 (x, q) = p 1 (1 − δx N ) + δx 1 . Since x 1 = u 1 (x, q) and
, or equivalently,
On the other hand, player 2's expected payoff is
By consistency, we have
. Together with (6), it requires that
To see a contradiction, as δ converges to 1, observe that the right-hand side converges to 1 + p 1 (1 − p 1 ), which is strictly greater than 1 as long as p 1 > 0. However, x N never exceeds 1. Thus, for a sufficiently high δ, the efficient strategy profile (x, q) cannot be an equilibrium.
Next, we construct an inefficient equilibrium. Letδ = max
so thatδ < 1. Consider a strategy profile (x, q) such that
1−(1−p 1 )δ ; x 2 = x 3 = 0; and
and in any two-player subgame the active players follow the strategy according to Proposition 1. Since player 2 and player 3 decline to be a proposer in the initial state, the strategy profile is inefficient. To see that (x, q) constructs an equilibrium for δ >δ, due to Lemma 2, it suffices to verify the following two conditions. i) Optimality:
Calculate each player's excess surpluses. It is easy to see that e 1 (N, x) > 0 and e i ({i}, x) = 0 for all i ∈ N . For all i ∈ {1, 2}, due to Proposition 1, x (i,{1,2}) i = p 1 + p 2 , and hence
Then, δ >δ implies e i ({1, 2}, x) < 0. Similarly, we have e i ({1, 3}, x) < 0 for all i ∈ {1, 3}. Given x, therefore, D 1 = {N }, D 2 = {{2}}, and D 3 = {{3}}.
ii) Consistency: Compute each player's expected payoff:
Even if there are multiple dominating players, as see (b) in Figure 2 , they can generate an additional advantage by forming a coalition with other dominating players and splitting non-dominating players into two isolated groups. In the next example, we construct an equilibrium in a chordal network in which there are two dominating players. ). Suppose δ >δ ≈ 0.91. 12 We construct an equilibrium (x, q) such that
In any subgame in which the number of active players is less than or equal to three, • e 1 ({1, 2}, x) = δx
(1,{1,2}) 1
• e 1 ({1, 3}, x) = δx
• e 1 ({1, 2, 4}, x) = δx
Given e 1 (S, x) for all S ⊆ N 1 , it is routine to see that δ >δ implies D 1 (x) = {{1, 3}}. Similarly, we also have D 3 (x) = {{1, 3}}.
ii) Even Players' Optimality: For any {2} S ⊆ N 2 , player 2's S-formation induces a complete network. Thus, given x, one can compute player 2's excess surpluses:
12 Note thatδ is a solution to δ(8 − 8δ + δ 2 ) = (4 − δ)(1 − δ)(4 + 2δ − δ 2 ).
• e 2 ({1, 2}, x) = e 2 ({2, 3}, x) = δx (2,{1,2}) 2
• e({1, 2, 3}, x) = δx (2,{1,2,3}) 2
Observe that e 2 ({1, 2}, x) = e 2 ({2, 3}, x) > 0 for all δ; while e({1, 2, 3}, x) is strictly negative if δ >δ. Thus, for any δ >δ, we have D 2 (x) = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} and similarly D 4 (x) = {{1, 4}, {3, 4}}.
iii) Consistency: Given (x, q), compute each players' expected payoffs:
, and similarly u 3 (x, q) = x 3 and u 4 (x, q) = x 4 , and hence consistency holds.
Remark ( for all i ∈ N , the maximum welfare δ is achieved in an equilibrium. If we add a link between player 1 and player 3 in the circular network, then it becomes a chordal network as in Example 5. Since odd players can form a grand-coalition immediately, the maximum welfare is 1 2 (1 + δ), which is strictly greater than that of the circular network. However, the equilibrium welfare in Example 5 is δ(3−δ) 2(2−δ) which is strictly less than δ, which is the maximum welfare in the circle. This observation is reminiscent of the Braess's paradox. In fact, this result does not depend on the initial recognition probability p, as long as p 2 > 0 and p 4 > 0.
One can observe the negative welfare effect of adding a new link by computing the expected periods for a unanimous agreement. See Figure 3 . In the circle, it takes exactly 2 periods for a grand-coalition in the equilibrium. Note that all the players fully use their communication links whenever they are recognized as a proposer. In the chordal network, however, the expected periods for a unanimous agreement is 2.5. 14 If the even players 13 This question has been raised by Vijay Krishna.
14 (p2 + p4) × 2 + (p1 + p3) (p1 + p3) × 2 + (p2 + p4) (p1 + p3) × 3 + (p2 + p4) (p1 + p3) × 4 + · · · The expected periods for a grand-coalition is strictly greater than 2. In the first period, if the even players are selected as a proposer, then they choose one of the odd players as a bargaining partner to induce a three-player circle. In the circle, grand-coalition immediately forms. However, if the odd players are initially selected as a proposer, then they induce a three-player chain. In the chain, the leaf players decline to make an offer and hence an additional delay occurs with positive probability. as a bargaining partner to induce a three-player circle. In the circle, grand-coalition immediately forms. However, if the odd players are initially recognized as a proposer, they induces a three-player chain. In the chain, then the leaf players decline to make an offer and hence an additional delay occurs with positive probability.
Remark. In the random-proposer bargaining model, the equilibrium may not be unique even in the class of stationary subgame perfect equilibria. 15 However, the equilibrium constructed in Example 3, Example 4, and Example 5 is unique in the class of symmetric cutoff-strategy equilibria, in which identical players in terms of a position in a network and a recognition probability play the identical cutoff strategy.
15 To overcome multiplicity of equilibria, the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs has been studied in the random-proposer bargaining model. Eraslan (2002) shows the equilibrium payoff uniqueness for a weighted majority game and Eraslan and McLennan (2013) generalizes this result to a general simple game using fixed point index theorem. Unfortunately, those results cannot be applied to the model in which a player has a buyout option, because a player can expect some partial payoff by forming an intermediate subcoalition and hence the actual characteristic function that the players play is not of a simple game. The uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs is conjectured in a broader class of characteristic function form games, but it still remains as an open question. See Eraslan and McLennan (2013) for a discussion. Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 3 in a case of D(g) = ∅. Since g is a precomplete, note that there exists j 1 and j 2 such that d(j 1 , j 2 ; g) = 2. Let
, and J(g) = J 1 (g) ∪ J 2 (g). Lemma 4 provides a lower bound of the unique dominating player's expected payoff.
Lemma 4. Let g be a pre-complete network with D(g) = {i}. If (x, q) is an equilibrium of Γ = (g, p, δ), then
Proof.
Step 1: Consider a three-person chain, that is, J 1 = {j 1 } and J 2 = {j 2 }. Since
Rearranging the terms, we have the desired result.
Step 2: As an induction hypothesis, assume that for any pre-complete network g with 
For any k ∈ N and S ⊆ N such that i ∈ S, the induction hypothesis implies x
which yields a contradiction. Similarly, induction argument completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Case 1: D(g) = ∅)
Take any j ∈ J 1 . Since (x, q) is efficient, we have (∀j ∈ J 2 ) S∈C j q j (S) = 1 and
1−(1−p J 1 )δ , and hence
Now take any i ∈ D. Player i's optimality implies e i (N, x) ≥ e i (D, x), or equivalently,
has a single dominating player, Lemma 4 implies
By (9) and (10), we have
As δ → 1, the right hand side of (11) converges to p J ; while the left hand side converges to p 2 J . Since p J < 1, there existsδ < 1 such that the inequality (11) yields a contradiction for δ >δ.
Case 2: No Dominating Player
Now we consider a network without a dominating player. See (c) in Figure 2 for instance.
Even in a case of that there is no dominating player, we will show that some players can be a dominating player in the induced network by buying out only a part of their neighbors.
Before proving this, some lemmas are presented. First, whenever there is a dominating player in an incomplete network, Lemma 5, Lemma 6, and Lemma 7 show dominating players have some additional bargaining power compared to other non-dominating players.
In a network without a dominating player, Lemma 8 shows that each player's payoff should be strictly less than her recognition probability under any efficient equilibrium. For any non-circular pre-complete network without a dominating player, Lemma 9 finds a player who can be a dominating player avoiding a complete network. Combining those lemmas, therefore, when an efficient equilibrium is assumed, at least one player can be strictly better off by strategically delaying a unanimous agreement, which is a contradiction in turn.
Lemma 5. Let g be a pre-complete network with ∅ D(g) N (g) and (x, q) be an equilibrium of (g, p, δ) with δ < 1.
Proof. If |N (g)| = 3, due to Lemma 4, then
As an induction hypothesis, suppose the statement is true for any g with |N (g )| < n. Now consider g with |N (g)| = n. Take any i ∈ D(g). For any k ∈ N and any S such that
Lemma 5 says that for any dominating player, her expected payoff is strictly greater than her recognition probability. However, we need a stronger result: the difference between the expected payoff and the recognition probability is strictly positive even in the limit of that the discount factor converges to one. Lemma 6 shows that there exists such a dominating player and Lemma 7 proves it for all dominating players. For notational convenience, denote ∆ i = x i − p i and ∆
. If g (i,S) is complete and non-trivial, by Proposition 1, note that e i (S, x) = δ(x
Lemma 6. Let g be a pre-complete network with ∅ D(g) N (g) and (x, q) be an equilibrium of (g, p, δ). There exists h ∈ D(g) such that
Proof. Take any h ∈ argmax i∈N ∆ i and let Q h = i∈N S h p i q i (S). For any i ∈ N and
≥ p h , and hence we have
where the second inequality is due to Lemma 4, which implies
and the last inequality comes from p h ≤ Q h , p h ≥ x h , and ∆ D ≤ |D|∆ h . Subtracting p h from both sides of (12), we have
Lemma 7. Let g be a pre-complete network with ∅ D(g) N (g) and (x, q) be an equilibrium of (g, p, δ).
Proof. We will show that lim δ→1 min i∈D ∆ i > 0. Let L = argmin i∈D ∆ i . Since g is a pre-complete, as before there exists j 1 and j 2 such that d(j 1 , j 2 ; g) = 2, and let J 1 (g) =
Case 1: Suppose |J 1 | = |J 2 | = 1. Then, for each j ∈ J, q j ({j}) + ∈L q j ({j, }) = 1, and hence there exists ∈ L such that j∈J p j (q j ({j}) + q j ({j, })) ≥
Thus, by Lemma 6, we have the desired result,
Case 2: As an induction hypothesis, for any pre-complete network g with ∅ D(g ) N (g ) and 1 ≤ |J 1 (g )| ≤ a and 1 ≤ |J 2 (g )| ≤ b and any equilibrium (x , q ) of (g , p , δ), assume that lim δ→1 min i∈D(g ) (x i − p i ) > 0. Now we consider a pre-complete network g with ∅ D(g) N (g) and |J 1 (g)| = a and |J 2 (g)| = b + 1. Due to the induction hypothesis, there exists ∆ > 0 such that ∆ ≥ lim δ→1 (x (j,J ) − p ) for all α ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ J α , and J ⊆ J α . Then, we have
If lim δ→1 ∆ ≥ ∆ , then there is nothing to prove. Suppose that lim δ→1 ∆ ≤ ∆ . As
By Lemma 5, we have the desired result, lim δ→1 ∆ ≥
Lemma 8. Let g be a pre-complete network with
Proof. Since g is pre-complete and (x, q) is efficient, for all j ∈ N , q j (S) > 0 implies g (j,S)
is complete. Thus, each player i can expect p i in the next period by rejecting any offer.
Suppose player i gets an offer with y i < δ 2 p i . By rejecting y i , i can be strictly better since the stationary strategy profile guarantees δp i in the next period. Hence, x i ≥ δp i for all i ∈ N . If there exists i ∈ N such that x i > δp i , then it must be x N > δp N = δ, which is infeasible.
Lemma 9. Let g be a pre-complete non-circular network with D(g) = ∅. There exist
Proof. Since g is pre-complete non-circular, its complete covering number is 2. Let M be a minimal complete cover of g.
We will show that there exists i ∈ N and j ∈ M c i such that i ∈ D(g (i,{i,j}) ) N (g (i,{i,j}) ), by constructing such a pair of i and j in the following two cases. First, suppose there exists
Proof of Proposition 3 (Case 2: D(g) = ∅)
Suppose (x, q) is an efficient equilibrium. Due to Lemma 8, for all i ∈ N and all S ∈ C i ,
which converges to 0 as δ → 1. By Lemma 9, there exists i, j ∈ N (g) such that i ∈ D(g (i,{i,j}) ) and {i, j} ∈ C i . Due to Lemma 7, there exists ∆ i such that x 
As δ → 1, note that e i ({i, j}, x) ≥ ∆ i > 0. Thus for a sufficiently high δ, e i ({i, j}, x) > e i (S, x) for all S ∈ C i , which contradicts to optimality of player i.
The Necessary Condition : Incomplete Networks
We have considered pre-complete non-circular networks. To complete the necessary condition, we have to allow any incomplete non-circular network. Proposition 4 implies that for any game with an incomplete non-circular network, if the players play efficient strategies, then a pre-complete non-circular network must be induced with positive probability.
Proposition 4. Let g be an incomplete network. For any efficient strategy profile (x, q), there exists π ∈ Π x,q (g) such that g π is a pre-complete network. In addition, if g is a noncircular network, then there exists π ∈ Π x,q (g) such that g π is a pre-complete non-circular network.
Proof. Suppose that g is neither pre-complete nor complete. Now we construct a sequence of coalition formations which is consistent with (x, q) and the sequence induces a pre-
Let g 1 = g and take i 1 ∈ argmax i∈I(g 1 ) d(i, i * ; g 1 ). Pick any S 1 such that q i 1 (S 1 ) > 0.
Let g 2 = g (i 1 ,S 1 ) . Similarly, pick i 2 ∈ argmax i∈I(g 2 ) d(i, i * ; g 2 ). Pick any S 2 such that q i 2 (S 2 ) > 0. Since (x, q) is efficient, |S 1 | ≥ 2, |S 2 | ≥ 2, and so on; and I(g 1 ) I(g 2 ) · · · .
Thus, one can repeat this process until I(g T ) = ∅, after which g T is a pre-complete network. This proves the first part. In addition, assume that g is not circular. If g is a tree, then any induced network cannot be circular and hence g T is not circular. If g has a cycle but not a circular network, then deg i * (g) = deg i * (g T ) ≥ 3, and hence g T cannot be circular.
Non-transferability of Recognition Probabilities
We have assumed that the initial recognition probabilities are transferable. That is, when they trade their communication links, they also trade their chances of being a proposer as well. In some other environment, however, players cannot trade their recognition probabilities. With non-transferable recognition probabilities, instead of (1), we define the recognition probabilities in any state π in the following way:
With non-transferable recognition probabilities, obtaining an efficient equilibrium is impossible even in circular networks.
Theorem 2. With non-transferable recognition probabilities, an efficient equilibrium exists for all discount factors if and only if the underlying network is complete.
Before proving the theorem, we construct an inefficient equilibrium in a four-player circular network as an example.
Example 6 (A Circular Network with Non-Transferable Recognition Probabilities).
Let g = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {12, 23, 34, 14}) and p = , then there exists a cutoff strategy equilibrium (x, q) such that
• q 1 ({1}) = q 2 ({2}) = 1; q 3 ({3, 4}) = q 4 ({3, 4}) = 1.
That is, player 1 and player 2 decline to make an offer and wait for a three-player complete network induced by player 3 or player 4. . Given x, player 1's excess surpluses are:
, since e 1 (S, x) for all {1} S ⊆ N 1 , we have D 1 (x) = {{1}}, which implies q 1 ({1}) = 1. Similarly we have q 2 ({2}) = 1. Now calculate player 3's excess surpluses:
, since e 3 ({3, 4}, x) > 0 and e 1 (S, x) < 0 for any other {1} ⊆ S ⊆ N 1 , we have q 3 ({3, 4}) = 1, and similarly q 4 ({3, 4}) = 1. ii) Consistency: Given (x, q), calculate each player's expected payoff:
and similarly, u 2 (x, q) = x 2 and u 4 (x, q) = x 4 .
The equilibrium payoff vector converges to ( , 0) or its permutations. However, there is no symmetric equilibrium. Now we prove Theorem 2. Since Proposition 1 still holds with non-transferable recognition probabilities, this directly proves the sufficient condition. Proposition 5 shows that an efficient equilibrium is impossible for any pre-complete network. Due to the first part of Proposition 4, then, the necessary condition is proved for any incomplete network.
Proposition 5. Suppose that recognition probabilities are not transferable. Let g be a pre-complete. For any p, there existsδ < 1 such that for all δ >δ, any efficient strategy profile (x, q) cannot be an equilibrium in Γ = (g, p, δ).
. Since non-transferable recognition probabilities are assumed, we have
In addition, since S -formation is optimal for each , it must be e (S , x) ≥ e ({ }, x) = 0, or equivalently, j∈S x j ≤ x ( ,S ) . Summing this over and plugging (15), we have
Note that ρ is strictly positive and does not depend on δ.
On the other hand, for any k's S-formation such that q k (S) > 0 and any j ∈ S, it must
where Q j = k∈N p k S j q k (S). By the consistency condition, it follows that
Combining (16) and (17), we have,
j∈S p j . However, this contradicts to the fact that ρ > 0 is fixed. Thus, there existsδ < 1 such that for all δ >δ, the inequality (18) is violated.
Remark. In network-restricted unanimity games, welfare can be improved by allowing for players to trade their recognition probabilities. If the recognition probabilities are not transferable, a proposer has less incentive to form a coalition. In general characteristic function form games, however, the effect of transferability of recognition probabilities on welfare may be negative. For instance, when there exists a veto player, non-veto players may form a union, to be a new veto coalition, as a transitional state, rather than immediately forming an efficient coalition. If the recognition probabilities are transferable, then they have stronger incentive to form transitional inefficient coalitions. Thus, for a non-unanimity game, banning players from trading recognition probabilities may improve welfare. See Lee (2014) for details. optimal. Therefore, player i has no profitable deviation strategy given player j's cutoff strategy.
Case 2: |N (g)| > 2. Suppose that, for any game (g , p , δ) with |N (g )| < |N (g)|, (p ,q ) is an equilibrium, where p = {{p π i } i∈N π } π∈Π(g ) andq = {{q π i } i∈N π } π∈Π(g ) . Note that, in such an equilibrium, for each i ∈ N (g ), player i's expected payoff is p i . We show that a cutoff strategy profile σ = (p,q) is an equilibrium for (g, p, δ) by verifying player i has no profitable deviation strategy given other players cutoff strategies. Recall that if player i follows the cutoff strategy, then her expected payoff is p i (1 − δ) + δp i = p i . Since all the other players except for i are supposed to play stationary strategies, it is enough to consider the proposal strategy and the response strategy of player i separately.
• Proposal strategy: Consider player i's proposal strategy q i such that q i (S) > 0 for some S N instead ofq i . By forming S N , player i expects p (i,S) i in the subsequent game, because (g (i,S ), p (i,S) , δ) is a less-than-n-player game with a complete network. In order for S to form, it must be y j ≥ δp j for all j ∈ S \ {i}.
Note also that p 
On the other hand, player i's proposal gain from followingq i is 1 − j∈N \{i} δp j = (1 − δ)p N + δp i = (1 − δ) + δp i .
Since (19) is strictly less than (20), any proposal strategy which forms S N is not optimal for i. Among proposal strategies which form N , it is clear that making an offer with y = δp is optimal.
• Response strategy: Since each j ∈ N \ {i} is supposed to play the given cutoff strategy, player i is guaranteed at least δp i by rejecting any offer. Thus, it is optimal for i to accept any offer with y i ≥ δp i and to reject any offer with y i < δp i .
Proof of ii) in Proposition 1.
The statement is true for |N (g)| = 2 from the proof of Proposition 1. As an induction hypothesis, suppose that the statement is true for any game with less-than-n-player games and now consider a game Γ = (g, p, δ) with |N (g)| = n. Due to Lemma 1, only cutoff strategy equilibria are considered. Suppose that there exists a cutoff strategy equilibrium (x, q).
Case 1: Suppose that q =q. For each i ∈ N , since k∈N p k S⊆N q k (S)1(i ∈ S) = 1, we have
Due to consistency, we obtain u i (x,q) = x i and x N = 1. Plugging them into (21), we have x i = p i . Thus, for any cutoff equilibrium involving maximum coalition formation strategiesq yields a payoff vector p.
Case 2: Suppose that there exists i who plays a non-maximum coalition formation strategy so that q i (S) > 0 with S N . This implies that
• x N = u N (x, q) < 1; and
• there exists S N such that i ∈ S and e i (S, x) ≥ e i (N, x).
Thus for each i ∈ S, we have
By the induction hypothesis, the inequality implies δx S + 1 < δp S + δ.
On the other hand, by letting Q j = k∈N p k S⊆N q k (S)1(j ∈ S), for each j ∈ S, we have x j = u j (x, q) ≥ p j (1 − δx N ) + δ(Q j x j + (1 − Q j )p j )
i) Optimality: After i's maximum coalition formation, the active players face a game with a circular network g and η(g ) = m − 1. Due to the induction hypothesis, since x (i,{i,j,k}) i = δ m−1 (p i + p j + p k ), we have
Suppose i decline to make an offer, that is i forms {i}. Since e i ({i}, x) = 0 is strictly less than (24), i's {i}-formation is not optimal. Suppose i forms {i, j}.
Note that
Thus, we have
which is strictly less than (24), and hence i's S-formation with |S| = 2 is not optimal.
ii) Consistency: Since all the players play maximum coalition formation strategies, player i's continuation payoff is:
Since u i (x, q) = x i , rearranging the terms, we have
which yields x i = δ m p i .
